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The rapid emergence of Internet of Things is propelled by the logic of two irresistible 
technological arguments: machine intelligence and networked communications. Things are more 
useful and effective when they are smarter, and even more so when they can talk to each other. 
Exactly the same logic applies to things that populate the world of military battles.  They too can 
serve the human warfighters better when they possess more intelligence and more ways to 
coordinate their actions among themselves. We call this the Internet of Battle Things, IoBT. In 
some ways, IoBT is already becoming a reality1, but 20-30 years from now it is likely to become 
a dominant presence in warfare. 
The battlefield of the future will be densely populated by a variety of entities (“things”) – some 
intelligent and some only marginally so – performing a broad range of tasks: sensing, 
communicating, acting, and collaborating with each other and human warfighters2. They will 
include sensors, munitions, weapons, vehicles, robots, and human-wearable devices.  Their 
capabilities will include selectively collecting and processing information, acting as agents to 
support sensemaking, undertaking coordinated defensive actions, and unleashing a variety of 
effects on the adversary. They will do all this collaboratively, continually communicating, 
coordinating, negotiating and jointly planning and executing their activities. In other words, they 
will be the Internet of Battle Things.  
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Figure 1 Broad variety of systems and other "things" will communicate and collaborate on 
the battlefield.  (Source: Illustration by Evan Jensen, U.S. Army Research Laboratory) 
To become a reality, however, this bold vision will have to overcome a number of major 
challenges.  As one example of such a challenge, the communications among things will have to 
be flexible and adaptive to rapidly changing situations and military missions. This will involve 
organizing and managing large number of dynamic assets (devices and channels) to achieve 
changing objectives with multiple complex tradeoffs. Such adaptation, management and re-
organization of the networks must be accomplished almost entirely autonomously, in order to 
avoid imposing additional burdens on the human warfighters, and without much reliance on 
support and maintenance services. How can this be done?    
Secondly, human warfighters, under extreme cognitive and physical stress, will be strongly 
challenged by the massive complexity of the IoBT and of the information it will produce and 
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carry. IoBT will have to assist the humans in making useful sense of this massive, complex, 
confusing, and potentially deceptive ocean of information, while taking into account the ever-
changing mission, as well as, the social, cognitive and physical needs of humans. 
Finally, nobody can discount the most important feature of the battle – the enemy. Besides being 
a lethal physical threat to the humans and IoBT, the enemy will be lurking in and around the 
IoBT networks and its information. IoBT itself will be a battlefield between its owners and 
defenders, and its uninvited part-owners – attackers. How will IoBT manage risk and uncertainty 
in this highly adversarial, deceptive environment? 
These are some of the questions that were discussed at the strategic planning meeting that was 
organized by the US Army Research Laboratory (http://www.arl.army.mil) on 9-10 November 
2015, and brought together a number of scientists from academia and industry, and military 
experts. The suggestions and concerns that emerged at the meeting coalesced into a rich and 
ambitious research agenda, summarized below.   
Managing and Adapting the IoBT 
In spite of voluminous, current and past research on related topics in network science and 
engineering, merely by virtue of its exceptionally large scale IoBT will require new theoretical 
results, models, concepts and technical approaches. Indeed, IoBT’s number of nodes for a future 
Army brigade might be several orders of magnitude greater than anything that has been 
considered in current practice. This is particularly true in the environments where such a brigade 
will find it advantageous to make use of networked devices and channels that it does not own, 
e.g., when making use of existing local civilian IoT (networking infrastructure and things) in 
military operations in a megacity. In this case, the meeting’s participants suggested, IoBT scale 
on the order of a million of things per square kilometer is not an unreasonable target for 
exploration.  
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Figure 2 Combatants will perform cyber attacks partly through the civilian Internet of 
Things to which they will be inevitably connected.  (Source: Illustration by Evan Jensen, 
U.S. Army Research Laboratory) 
On the other hand, the massive scale of IoBT can be advantageous in practice and even for 
theoretical purposes. For example, availability of very large and densely positioned number of 
things, such as sensors can help eliminate currently common concerns about availability of any 
of them at a given time. To this end, theoretical results are needed to understand the degree of 
determinism resulting from very large ensemble of things and data.  
Quite apart from its large scale, extreme heterogeneity of IoBT will call for new research and 
approaches. Not only the local IoT will consist of a broad range of commercial things and 
networks, but even the equipment that the warfighters will bring with them into the battle will 
likely rely on commercial offerings. It is probable that future commercial IoT will continue to 
exhibit a lack of standards, partly driven by desire of individual manufacturers to control its 
market, and will be generally chaotic. The military will have to adapt rapidly – and to have 
suitable technologies and techniques for such an adaptation – to use a broad variety of things, 
protocols, and communication technologies from multiple manufacturers.  
In such a heterogeneous, highly dynamic and largely unpredictable environment, new 
approaches will be needed to facilitate discovery, characterization and tracking of relevant, 
available and useful things, dynamically in time and space.  In particular, a military force that 
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utilizes an existing IoT of a local society, e.g., a megacity, will not able to make reliable 
assumptions about behaviors and performance characteristics of any parts of its IoBT; instead 
such behaviors and characteristics will have to be learned and updated automatically and 
dynamically during the operation. Speaking of complex and unpredictable behaviors, one must 
not forget that humans – whether we call them “things” or not – are crucial and highly influential 
elements of IoBT. Behaviors and intents of humans – friendly warfighters, adversaries, and 
neutral civilians – will have to be dynamically detected, identified, characterized and projected in 
order to operate the IoBT.   
Communications between things will also be challenged by high complexity, the dynamics and 
the scale of IoBT.  Finding, sharing and managing communication channels, between large 
numbers of competing, heterogeneous and often unpredictable things will require novel 
approaches. Highly intelligent automation will be required to continually allocate and 
reconfigure the resources of the communications network. Information-sharing strategies and 
policies – who talks to whom, when, about what, and how long – will have to be automatically 
designed and modified dynamically. Highly scalable architectures and protocols will be needed, 
along with rigorous methods to determine and validate properties of protocols and architectures. 
In extreme situations, when IoBT experiences catastrophic collapse or becomes largely 
unavailable, or untrustworthy due to enemy actions, the autonomous management of IoBT will 
need to provide at least a “get me home” capability, which will enable the continuation of 
operations , even if at a limited level of functionality. 
Additional complexity will arise from the wide range of timing constraints on communications. 
Some communications can wait for hours, while other communications will pose real-time 
requirements, for example for sensing and actuating.  The channels will be constrained in highly 
heterogeneous ways as well. It is expected that 30 years from now, consumers will use wireless 
channels typically for only a few meters before the data enters fiber or other high-capacity 
channels; at the same time the military will require at least a few kilometers of wireless channels 
before encountering fiber.  
To enable the dynamic management of IoBT, situational awareness of the IoBT as a whole will 
be formulated and updated rapidly and automatically; therefore new approaches will be desired 
directed towards the ability to measure relatively few variables of the complex system while 
thereby obtaining or inferring sufficiently complete information about the system. 
While managing the IoBT, its purposes and uses must be taken into account, and these will be 
diverse. Some of its purposes will be relatively well understood, such as tactical military logistics 
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or distributed computing. Others will be novel and will emerge from the availability of IoBT 
itself, such as perhaps use of IoBT for Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) needs, and as a 
supplement to, or replacement for, GPS.  
Making IoBT Information Useful 
As important as communications bandwidth is for effective operation of IoBT, it is the human 
cognition bandwidth that will emerge as the most severe constraint3. Human warfighters do not 
need and cannot process the enormously large flows of information produced and delivered by 
IoBT. Instead, humans seek well-formed, reasonably-sized, essential information that is highly 
relevant to their cognitive needs, such as effective indications and warnings that pertain to their 
current situation and mission. Responding to each thing that demands the human’s attention, and 
to each piece of data that seem vaguely interesting, is not a feasible option in the context of 
IoBT. In fact, a key risk of IoBT is providing human warfighters (and intelligent things) with 
inappropriate information that leads – or misleads – to an action with an outcome worse than 
what would occur without that ‘information’.  
To make its information useful, IoBT technologies will have to deal with a large volume and 
complexity of information that are truly unprecedented in their extent4. Arguably, the quantity of 
data within IoBT will far exceed any likely advances predicted by Moore’s Law and ever more 
efficient use of bandwidth might offer in the future.  Besides the sheer volume, the complexity of 
the information will be formidable. For example, levels of abstraction, trustworthiness and value 
of information (produced or consumed) will vary drastically between different things.  
The very foundations of information theory will need to be reconsidered; for example, ensemble 
probability densities are foundational for information theory, and require the underlying process 
to be ergodic. However, the IoBT is expected to have nonlinear dynamic processes that are 
sufficiently complex to generate events with non-ergodic statistics. The information entailed by 
the occurrence of such events must be based on single time series and not on an ensemble of time 
series5. Furthermore, non-intuitive, novel phenomena may emerge in the transfer of information 
between dissimilar large networks. An example would be in how situational awareness is 
modified by the information exchanged back and forth between IoBT and the social network of 
human warfighters, see e.g., 6 and references therein. Such unexpected phenomena may also 
influence – in yet-unknown ways – the ability of warfighters to control, inform and be informed 
by IoBT. 
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Still, at the very least, the IoBT’s colossal volume of information must be reduced to a 
manageable level, and to a reasonably meaningful content, before it is delivered to humans and 
intelligent things. A likely target for compression and fusion of data into information, the 
meeting’s participants conjectured, would be by a factor of 10E15. One approach to such a 
challenging fusion task is to populate IoBT, with a layered hierarchy of information brokers7, or 
“concierges”, which would aggregate, fuse, interpret and deliver appropriate information. The 
fusion process should begin at the lowest possible level; for example, whenever possible, all 
information-producing things should be equipped with the means to perform locally a degree of 
filtering, interpretation and fusion, before sending data to the network. Although such layers of 
intermediaries do complicate or restrict the discovery of underlying data, it may be a necessary 
price to pay for arriving at useful, manageable and meaningful information.  
However, for information brokers to do their job, they need to know what constitutes useful 
information. Where would such knowledge come from? One source could be mission planning 
and rehearsal that could help determine what information is required by the mission-performing 
agents (human and artificial), and what is the likely available information. To capture the 
resulting knowledge, a machine-interpretable, formal, broadly applicable and military-relevant 
language will be needed for expressing information needs in highly heterogeneous IoBT8. 
Moving beyond the inevitable limitations of mission planning and rehearsal, IoBT will need 
approaches to self-learning of what information is needed for particular warfighter(s) and 
particular mission. Such approaches will likely require a form of integration of machine learning 
and semantic knowledge-based techniques.  
More generally, executable models of the IoBT and its surrounding world are needed to enable 
validation, interpretation, fusion, and assessing trustworthiness of the information (e.g., 9). Large 
scale simulation may help large scale sensing and interpretation of information in a targeted, 
purposeful manner.  The research on formulating and automatically creating (and dynamically 
maintaining) such models is in its infancy. Effective solutions to this challenge will likely 
involve distributed self-modeling, self-calibration, and self-validation of IoBT. 
Dealing with Deception and Adversarial Nature of IoBT 
Nothing differentiates IoBT from IoT more than the battle – the B in IoBT – against a 
determined and lethal enemy. The adversarial nature of the environment is the primary concern 
in the life of IoBT. The enemy threatens physical survival and functioning of IoBT by kinetic, 
directed-energy and electronic attacks against its things, by jamming the RF channels, by 
destroying fiber channels and by depriving IoBT of its power sources. The enemy also threatens 
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the confidentiality, integrity, availability of the information within IoBT, by electronic 
eavesdropping, and by deploying malware into IoBT10. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
the enemy attacks the cognition of human warfighters. Humans will be elements within IoBT 
that are most susceptible to deceptions, particularly to those based on cognitive and cultural 
biases11. Humans’ use of IoBT will be handicapped when they are concerned (even if 
incorrectly) that the information is untrustworthy12 or that some elements of IoBT are controlled 
by the enemy. Similar susceptibilities, in part, apply to artificial intelligent entities.  
Among the top priorities will be to minimize the enemy’s opportunities to acquire information 
about IoBT and the warfighters it serves. While many of the applicable measures are the same as 
those for conventional battlefield networks, the exceptional scale, heterogeneity and density of 
IoBT offer additional opportunities for friendly information protection13.  The sheer quantity of 
things (especially in those cases when friendly forces leverage the local IoT) permits the use of 
“disposable” security: devices that are believed to be potentially compromised by the enemy are 
simply discarded or disconnected from the IoBT. To defeat the enemy’s eavesdropping, the 
defenders may want to take advantage of plentiful availability of things and inject misleading 
information into a fraction of them14. The density, complexity and diversity of message traffic 
within the IoBT will make it more difficult for the enemy to perform the traditional traffic 
analysis that could reveals details of the friendly command and control structure. Similarly, with 
a large number and density of things, it may be less expensive and more efficient to stymie the 
enemy’s cyber intrusions by creating large, believable honeypots and honeynets, which are 
currently expensive to produce and to maintain dynamically. Although in the long run a 
honeynet may be less expensive than the devastation wrought by an adversary’s cyber intrusion. 
Besides acquiring friendly information, i.e., violating its confidentially, the enemy will attempt 
to violate the information’s integrity, by modifying it with cyber malware, inserting rogue things 
into IoBT, intercepting and corrupting it while in motion, between the things, and presenting 
wrong information to the information-acquiring things, e.g., sensors. IoBT will likely fight back 
by anomaly detection that can highlight unexpected data patterns, unexplained dynamic changes, 
or lack of expected events (the dog that does not bark)15. To enable the anomaly detection, 
machine learning approaches will be developed to deal with the data as big and as dynamic as 
IoBT will possess. Such a continuous learning process will be computationally and bandwidth-
wise expensive. It will be further challenged by the possibility that the enemy will adapt and 
evolve faster than the learning process can. In order to prevent the enemy from acquiring 
physical or software modifications of friendly things, approaches will be needed to achieve 
large-scale physical fingerprinting (e.g., collection of power consumption patterns) of things and 
continuous IoBT-wide monitoring of such patterns16.  More generally, there will be means for 
9 
 
active “stimulative intelligence” – ongoing physical and informational probing of IoBT that 
could help reveal the structure and behavior, including anomalous and suspicious ones, of the 
IoBT17. 
Learning normal patterns and detecting anomalous deviations, however, does not work well 
against a well-designed deception18, 19. In fact, learning can be a very dangerous double-edged 
sword with respect to deception. A common approach to deception is for the enemy to cause the 
friendly forces to learn a certain normal pattern, and then perform actions that blend into that 
pattern, but result in an unanticipated outcome. Any measure of normalcy can be defeated by 
effective deception. Still, very large scale and heterogeneity of IoBT may help defeat deception 
because “lying consistently is difficult;” it may be particularly difficult when the available 
sources of information are so numerous and are as heterogeneous as in IoBT. In general, much 
research is needed on approaches to counter-deception, discovery or rejection of deception for 
uniquely complex environment of IoBT25. And, considering that friendly IoBT will be 
necessarily connected with the local civilian IoT and thereby to the enemy’s IoBT, approaches 
are needed to performing offensive operations executed within the intertwined space of friendly 
and enemy networks. 
Such advanced capabilities will not be possible without new theoretical explorations.  Fighting 
the battle of IoBT may require major new results in game theory, particularly focused on 
problems with very large number and very diverse game moves; near-infinite opportunities for 
probing; high complexity of utility functions, and partial observability of the game board limited 
to a very small fraction of the overall space. New theory is needed to formalize and normalize 
diverse definitions and conceptualizations of risks20 and uncertainty. Deception should be 
integral to this theoretical analysis. For example, theoretical results should help predict the 
appropriate (or counterproductive) degree of complexity for a successful deception.    
 
Disclaimer 
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